On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Bimatrix Games

C. Berden; H.J.M. Peters

doi:10.1007/s11238-005-3986-1

On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Bimatrix Games

C. Berden^*
, H.J.M. Peters

^*Corresponding author for this work

Quantitative Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2× 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is established for which cases increased risk aversion of player 2 benefits or hurts player 2.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	359-370
Journal	Theory and Decision
Issue number	60
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-3986-1
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2006

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abstract = "Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2× 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is established for which cases increased risk aversion of player 2 benefits or hurts player 2.",

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AB - Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2× 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is established for which cases increased risk aversion of player 2 benefits or hurts player 2.

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On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Bimatrix Games

Abstract

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