On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Bimatrix Games

C. Berden*, H.J.M. Peters

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2× 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is established for which cases increased risk aversion of player 2 benefits or hurts player 2.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)359-370
JournalTheory and Decision
Issue number60
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2006

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