On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries

D. Damianov; Ronald Peeters

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.012

On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries

D. Damianov^*, Ronald Peeters^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We show that a policy of disclosing the ticket sales during a fundraising lottery raises total revenue when there are more than two bettors. The optimal timing of the disclosure is when about half of the players have purchased lottery tickets. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	73-76
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	150
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.012
Publication status	Published - Jan 2017

JEL classifications

d44 - Auctions
d62 - Externalities
d64 - "Altruism; Philanthropy"

Keywords

Charity lotteries
Ticket sales
Disclosure policy
PUBLIC-GOODS
RENT-SEEKING

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http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176516304645

Cite this

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title = "On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries",

abstract = "We show that a policy of disclosing the ticket sales during a fundraising lottery raises total revenue when there are more than two bettors. The optimal timing of the disclosure is when about half of the players have purchased lottery tickets. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.",

keywords = "Charity lotteries, Ticket sales, Disclosure policy, PUBLIC-GOODS, RENT-SEEKING",

author = "D. Damianov and Ronald Peeters",

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year = "2017",

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doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.012",

language = "English",

volume = "150",

pages = "73--76",

journal = "Economics Letters",

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AU - Damianov, D.

AU - Peeters, Ronald

N1 - no data used

PY - 2017/1

Y1 - 2017/1

N2 - We show that a policy of disclosing the ticket sales during a fundraising lottery raises total revenue when there are more than two bettors. The optimal timing of the disclosure is when about half of the players have purchased lottery tickets. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

AB - We show that a policy of disclosing the ticket sales during a fundraising lottery raises total revenue when there are more than two bettors. The optimal timing of the disclosure is when about half of the players have purchased lottery tickets. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

KW - Charity lotteries

KW - Ticket sales

KW - Disclosure policy

KW - PUBLIC-GOODS

KW - RENT-SEEKING

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.012

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.012

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 150

SP - 73

EP - 76

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries

Abstract

JEL classifications

Keywords

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Cite this