On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries

D. Damianov, Ronald Peeters

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We show that a policy of disclosing the ticket sales during a fundraising lottery raises total revenue when there are more than two bettors. The optimal timing of the disclosure is when about half of the players have purchased lottery tickets. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)73-76
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume150
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2017

JEL classifications

  • d44 - Auctions
  • d62 - Externalities
  • d64 - "Altruism; Philanthropy"

Keywords

  • Charity lotteries
  • Ticket sales
  • Disclosure policy
  • PUBLIC-GOODS
  • RENT-SEEKING

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