On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries

Damian S. Damianov, Ronald Peeters

Research output: Working paper / PreprintWorking paper

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We show that a policy of disclosing the ticket sales during a fundraising lottery raises total revenue when there are more than two bettors. The optimal timing of the disclosure is when about half of the players have purchased lottery tickets.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Publication statusPublished - 2016

Publication series

SeriesGSBE Research Memoranda

JEL classifications

  • d44 - Auctions
  • d62 - Externalities
  • d64 - "Altruism; Philanthropy"


  • Charity lotteries
  • Ticket sales
  • Disclosure policy

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