On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria

P.J.J. Herings; A. Predtetchinski

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.023

On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria

P.J.J. Herings^*, A. Predtetchinski

^*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. A first example shows non-convergence to the asymmetric nash bargaining solution. A second example demonstrates the possibility of multiple limits.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	243-246
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	111
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.023
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2011

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10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.023

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title = "On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria",

abstract = "This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. A first example shows non-convergence to the asymmetric nash bargaining solution. A second example demonstrates the possibility of multiple limits.",

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