On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria

P.J.J. Herings*, A. Predtetchinski

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

190 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. A first example shows non-convergence to the asymmetric nash bargaining solution. A second example demonstrates the possibility of multiple limits.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)243-246
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume111
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2011

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this