On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers

Stefan Terstiege

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.010

On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers

Stefan Terstiege^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

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Abstract

I consider a monopolistic-pricing model in which the buyer does not know his valuation at the outset. The seller may induce him to acquire information even though she could easily disclose sufficient information herself.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	60-63
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	140
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.010
Publication status	Published - Mar 2016

JEL classifications

d82 - "Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design"
d83 - "Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief"
d86 - Economics of Contract: Theory

Keywords

Information acquisition
Information disclosure
Pricing
OPTIMAL AUCTIONS

Access to Document

10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.010Licence: Unspecified

Author's versionAccepted author manuscript, 213 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Cite this

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title = "On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers",

abstract = "I consider a monopolistic-pricing model in which the buyer does not know his valuation at the outset. The seller may induce him to acquire information even though she could easily disclose sufficient information herself.",

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KW - Information disclosure

KW - Pricing

KW - OPTIMAL AUCTIONS

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.010

M3 - Article

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SP - 60

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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