On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers

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Abstract

I consider a monopolistic-pricing model in which the buyer does not know his valuation at the outset. The seller may induce him to acquire information even though she could easily disclose sufficient information herself.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)60-63
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume140
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2016

JEL classifications

  • d82 - "Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design"
  • d83 - "Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief"
  • d86 - Economics of Contract: Theory

Keywords

  • Information acquisition
  • Information disclosure
  • Pricing
  • OPTIMAL AUCTIONS

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