ON EQUILIBRIA IN REPEATED GAMES WITH ABSORBING STATES

OJ VRIEZE; F THUIJSMAN

doi:10.1007/BF01254293

ON EQUILIBRIA IN REPEATED GAMES WITH ABSORBING STATES

OJ VRIEZE^*, F THUIJSMAN

^*Corresponding author for this work

Networks and Strategic Optimization

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We prove the existence of e-(nash) equilibria in two-person non-zerosum limiting average repeated games with absorbing states. These are stochastic games in which all states but one are absorbing. A state is absorbing if the probability of ever leaving that state is zero for all available pairs of actions.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	293-310
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	18
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01254293
Publication status	Published - 1989

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title = "ON EQUILIBRIA IN REPEATED GAMES WITH ABSORBING STATES",

abstract = "We prove the existence of e-(nash) equilibria in two-person non-zerosum limiting average repeated games with absorbing states. These are stochastic games in which all states but one are absorbing. A state is absorbing if the probability of ever leaving that state is zero for all available pairs of actions.",

author = "OJ VRIEZE and F THUIJSMAN",

year = "1989",

doi = "10.1007/BF01254293",

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journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",

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AU - VRIEZE, OJ

AU - THUIJSMAN, F

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N2 - We prove the existence of e-(nash) equilibria in two-person non-zerosum limiting average repeated games with absorbing states. These are stochastic games in which all states but one are absorbing. A state is absorbing if the probability of ever leaving that state is zero for all available pairs of actions.

AB - We prove the existence of e-(nash) equilibria in two-person non-zerosum limiting average repeated games with absorbing states. These are stochastic games in which all states but one are absorbing. A state is absorbing if the probability of ever leaving that state is zero for all available pairs of actions.

U2 - 10.1007/BF01254293

DO - 10.1007/BF01254293

M3 - Article

SN - 0020-7276

VL - 18

SP - 293

EP - 310

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

IS - 3

ER -

ON EQUILIBRIA IN REPEATED GAMES WITH ABSORBING STATES

Abstract

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