Obvious belief elicitation

Elias Tsakas

doi:10.26481/umagsb.2019001

Obvious belief elicitation

Elias Tsakas

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Working paper / Preprint › Working paper

554 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

An investigator is interested in arbitrarily approximating a subject's latent beliefs in obviously dominant strategies (Li, 2017). We prove that Karni's ascending mechanism (Karni, 2009) does not have an obviously dominant strategy. Thus, we introduce the novel descending Karni mechanism which always has obviously dominant strategies. Furthermore, under the assumption that the subject chooses an obviously dominant strategy, the true beliefs can be approximated with arbitrary precision with our mechanism. All our results hold for a very broad class of likelihood relations, going well beyond those that are represented by probabilistic beliefs.

Original language	English
Publisher	Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Number of pages	11
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2019001
Publication status	Published - 8 Jan 2019

Publication series

Series	GSBE Research Memoranda
Number	001

JEL classifications

c90 - Design of Experiments: General
c91 - Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
d81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
d82 - "Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design"
d83 - "Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief"

Keywords

belief elicitation
Karni mechanism
obvious dominance

Access to Document

10.26481/umagsb.2019001

RM19001Final published version, 549 KB

1 Article

Obvious belief elicitation
Tsakas, E., Nov 2019, In: Games and Economic Behavior. 118, p. 374-381 8 p.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Cite this

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