Norm Uncertainty and Voluntary Payments in the Field

Christoph Feldhaus, Tassilo Sobotta, Peter Werner

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We investigate behavioral reactions toward exogenous changes of implicit norm-relevant information in a natural field setting where customers are free to choose if and how much to pay for a service. Customers' voluntary payments are significantly affected by subtle information cues: cues that signal a high rather than a low payment norm increase payments by some 27%. Consistent with the conjecture that this effect is in large part driven by customers' uncertainty about the actual norm, responses are mitigated when explicit norm-relevant information is provided. Additional treatments suggest that the reactions to the cues are not driven by mere saliency but by the information deduced from the cues in the presence of uncertainty.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1855-1866
Number of pages12
JournalManagement Science
Volume65
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2019

Keywords

  • uncertainity
  • social norms
  • pay-what-you-want
  • WHAT-YOU-WANT
  • SOCIAL NORMS
  • REQUEST SIZE
  • PAY
  • BEHAVIOR
  • INCENTIVES
  • DONATIONS
  • ASK
  • RECIPROCITY
  • ALTRUISM

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