Non-cooperative Support for the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution

V. Britz, P.J.J. Herings*, A. Predtetchinski

*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

We study a model of non-cooperative multilateral unanimity bargaining on a full-dimensional payoff set. The probability distribution with which the proposing player is selected in each bargaining round follows an irreducible Markov process. If a proposal is rejected, negotiations break down with an exogenous probability and the next round starts with the complementary probability. As the risk of exogenous breakdown vanishes, stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs converge to the weighted Nash bargaining solution with the stationary distribution of the Markov process as the weight vector. 

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1951-1967
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume145
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2010

Keywords

  • Nash bargaining solution
  • Subgame perfect equilibrium
  • Stationary strategies
  • Markov process
  • MODEL
  • GAMES

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