Abstract
In a claims problem an estate has to be divided among several claimants whose total claim exceeds the size of the estate. This paper extends the
noncooperative approach, initiated by O’Neill (1982), by allowing players to put multiple claims on the same part of the estate, and by considering
the case where individual claims may exceed the estate. A full characterization of the set of Nash equilibria is obtained both for restricted claims
problems, where individual claims do not exceed the estate, and for the general case. Variations on the claim game are considered, which result
in proportional division in equilibrium.
noncooperative approach, initiated by O’Neill (1982), by allowing players to put multiple claims on the same part of the estate, and by considering
the case where individual claims may exceed the estate. A full characterization of the set of Nash equilibria is obtained both for restricted claims
problems, where individual claims do not exceed the estate, and for the general case. Variations on the claim game are considered, which result
in proportional division in equilibrium.
| Original language | English |
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| Place of Publication | onbekend |
| Publisher | Kwantitatieve Economie |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2008 |
Publication series
| Series | METEOR Research Memorandum |
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| Number | 038 |
| ISSN | 2666-8815 |