Negative Prices in Network Pricing Games

Andrés Cristi; Marc  Schröder

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2022.01.001

Negative Prices in Network Pricing Games

Andrés Cristi^*, Marc Schröder

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

In a Stackelberg network pricing game a leader sets prices for a given subset of edges so as to maximize profit, after which one or multiple followers choose a shortest path. Our main result shows that the profit when allowing for negative prices can be a factor Theta(log(m . (k) over bar)) larger than the maximum profit with only positive prices, where m is the number of priceable edges and (k) over bar

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	99-106
Number of pages	8
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	50
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2022.01.001
Publication status	Published - Mar 2022

Keywords

Stackelberg games
bundling
negative prices
road tolling
Road tolling
APPROXIMATION
MULTICOMMODITY NETWORKS
STACKELBERG
Bundling
PARADOX
REVENUE MAXIMIZATION
SELFISH USERS
Negative prices
EFFICIENCY

Access to Document

10.1016/j.orl.2022.01.001Licence: CC BY

Cite this

@article{a70b887cdc10424c919c038b4c08d1bf,

title = "Negative Prices in Network Pricing Games",

abstract = "In a Stackelberg network pricing game a leader sets prices for a given subset of edges so as to maximize profit, after which one or multiple followers choose a shortest path. Our main result shows that the profit when allowing for negative prices can be a factor Theta(log(m . (k) over bar)) larger than the maximum profit with only positive prices, where m is the number of priceable edges and (k) over bar",

keywords = "Stackelberg games, bundling, negative prices, road tolling, Road tolling, APPROXIMATION, MULTICOMMODITY NETWORKS, STACKELBERG, Bundling, PARADOX, REVENUE MAXIMIZATION, SELFISH USERS, Negative prices, EFFICIENCY",

author = "Andr{\'e}s Cristi and Marc Schr{\"o}der",

note = "No data used",

year = "2022",

month = mar,

doi = "10.1016/j.orl.2022.01.001",

language = "English",

volume = "50",

pages = "99--106",

journal = "Operations Research Letters",

issn = "0167-6377",

publisher = "Elsevier Science",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Negative Prices in Network Pricing Games

AU - Cristi, Andrés

AU - Schröder, Marc

N1 - No data used

PY - 2022/3

Y1 - 2022/3

N2 - In a Stackelberg network pricing game a leader sets prices for a given subset of edges so as to maximize profit, after which one or multiple followers choose a shortest path. Our main result shows that the profit when allowing for negative prices can be a factor Theta(log(m . (k) over bar)) larger than the maximum profit with only positive prices, where m is the number of priceable edges and (k) over bar

AB - In a Stackelberg network pricing game a leader sets prices for a given subset of edges so as to maximize profit, after which one or multiple followers choose a shortest path. Our main result shows that the profit when allowing for negative prices can be a factor Theta(log(m . (k) over bar)) larger than the maximum profit with only positive prices, where m is the number of priceable edges and (k) over bar

KW - Stackelberg games

KW - bundling

KW - negative prices

KW - road tolling

KW - Road tolling

KW - APPROXIMATION

KW - MULTICOMMODITY NETWORKS

KW - STACKELBERG

KW - Bundling

KW - PARADOX

KW - REVENUE MAXIMIZATION

KW - SELFISH USERS

KW - Negative prices

KW - EFFICIENCY

U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2022.01.001

DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2022.01.001

M3 - Article

SN - 0167-6377

VL - 50

SP - 99

EP - 106

JO - Operations Research Letters

JF - Operations Research Letters

IS - 2

ER -