National central banks in EMU: time for revision?

Marijn van der Sluis*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

The national central banks of the euro area are crucial to the monetary policy of the euro. Their Governors sit (on a personal title) on the Governing Council of the ECB, and they execute most of the monetary policies. Whereas the recent ruling by the German Constitutional Court on the Public Sector Purchases Program highlighted the uncomfortable role of the German Bundesbank in between national and EU law, the euro-crisis already showed other legal strains on the position of the national central banks in Economic and Monetary Union. This article argues that EMU empowered national central banks, even when it took away their power to individually set monetary policies for their respective Member States. The euro-crisis then disturbed the balance struck in the construction of the ECB between protecting national interests and effective decision-making, resulting in several legal problems.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)19-30
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Banking Regulation
Volume23
Issue number1
Early online date11 Aug 2021
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2022

Keywords

  • ECB
  • Eurozone
  • Independence
  • National central banks
  • INDEPENDENCE
  • PSPP
  • Monetary policy
  • Central bank independence

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