TY - JOUR

T1 - Nash Consistent Representation of Constitutions: A Reaction to the Gibbard Paradox

AU - Peleg, B.

AU - Peters, H.J.M.

AU - Storcken, A.J.A.

PY - 2002/1/1

Y1 - 2002/1/1

N2 - The concept of an effectivity function is adopted as a formal model of a constitution. A game form models the actions available and permissible to individuals in a society. As a representation of the constitution such a game form should endow each group in society with the same power as it has under the constitution. Another desirable property is Nash consistency of the game form: whatever the individual preferences, the resulting game should be minimally stable in the sense of possessing a Nash equilibrium. A first main result of the paper is a characterization of all effectivity functions that have a Nash consistent representation for the case without special structure on the set of alternatives (social states). Next, a similar result is derived for the case where the set of alternatives is a topological space and the effectivity function is topological. As a special case, veto functions are considered. Further results concern Pareto optimality of Nash equilibrium outcomes.

AB - The concept of an effectivity function is adopted as a formal model of a constitution. A game form models the actions available and permissible to individuals in a society. As a representation of the constitution such a game form should endow each group in society with the same power as it has under the constitution. Another desirable property is Nash consistency of the game form: whatever the individual preferences, the resulting game should be minimally stable in the sense of possessing a Nash equilibrium. A first main result of the paper is a characterization of all effectivity functions that have a Nash consistent representation for the case without special structure on the set of alternatives (social states). Next, a similar result is derived for the case where the set of alternatives is a topological space and the effectivity function is topological. As a special case, veto functions are considered. Further results concern Pareto optimality of Nash equilibrium outcomes.

U2 - 10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00095-6

DO - 10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00095-6

M3 - Article

VL - 43

SP - 267

EP - 287

JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

SN - 0165-4896

ER -