In presidential primaries, proportional campaign resource allocation to states with respect to their delegate numbers is a desirable concept. To study proportionality, we introduce a novel model for n-player multi-battle dynamic contests. We show that when players maximize their expected number of delegates there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which players allocate their resources proportionally. However for at least 4 number of states and at least 2 delegates, when players maximize their probability of winning, there is always a distribution of delegates over the states such that population proportionality is not satisfied.
|GSBE Research Memoranda
- c73 - "Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games"
- d72 - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Presidential elections
- dynamic contests
- presedential primaries
- population proportionality
- multi-battle contests