Multi-Battle n-Player Dynamic Contests

Nejat Anbarci, Kutay Cingiz, Mehmet Ismail

Research output: Working paperProfessional

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Abstract

In presidential primaries, proportional campaign resource allocation to states with respect to their delegate numbers is a desirable concept. To study proportionality, we introduce a novel model for n-player multi-battle dynamic contests. We show that when players maximize their expected number of delegates there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which players allocate their resources proportionally. However for at least 4 number of states and at least 2 delegates, when players maximize their probability of winning, there is always a distribution of delegates over the states such that population proportionality is not satisfied.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Publication statusPublished - 8 Feb 2018

Publication series

SeriesGSBE Research Memoranda
Number003

JEL classifications

  • c73 - "Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games"
  • d72 - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

Keywords

  • Presidential elections
  • dynamic contests
  • presedential primaries
  • population proportionality
  • multi-battle contests

Cite this

Anbarci, N., Cingiz, K., & Ismail, M. (2018). Multi-Battle n-Player Dynamic Contests. Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics. GSBE Research Memoranda, No. 003