@techreport{e65734c75dd24333b4c3e8b7ce0c4089,
title = "Multi-Battle n-Player Dynamic Contests",
abstract = "In presidential primaries, proportional campaign resource allocation to states with respect to their delegate numbers is a desirable concept. To study proportionality, we introduce a novel model for n-player multi-battle dynamic contests. We show that when players maximize their expected number of delegates there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which players allocate their resources proportionally. However for at least 4 number of states and at least 2 delegates, when players maximize their probability of winning, there is always a distribution of delegates over the states such that population proportionality is not satisfied.",
keywords = "Presidential elections, dynamic contests, presedential primaries, population proportionality, multi-battle contests",
author = "Nejat Anbarci and Kutay Cingiz and Mehmet Ismail",
year = "2018",
month = feb,
day = "8",
doi = "10.26481/umagsb.2018003",
language = "English",
series = "GSBE Research Memoranda",
publisher = "Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics",
number = "003",
address = "Netherlands",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics",
}