Minimal Manipulable: Unanimity and Nondictatorship

S. Maus; H.J.M. Peters; A.J.A. Storcken

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.04.014

Minimal Manipulable: Unanimity and Nondictatorship

S. Maus, H.J.M. Peters^*, A.J.A. Storcken

^*Corresponding author for this work

Quantitative Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the number of profiles at which a nondictatorial social choice function is manipulable. For three or more alternatives the lower bound is found for unanimous social choice functions. In the case of three alternatives the lower bound is found for surjective social choice functions. In both cases all social choice functions reaching the lower bound are characterized for more than two agents. In the case of two agents the characterized social choice functions form a subset of the set of all social choice functions reaching the minimum.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	675-691
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	43
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.04.014
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2007

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title = "Minimal Manipulable: Unanimity and Nondictatorship",

abstract = "This paper is concerned with the number of profiles at which a nondictatorial social choice function is manipulable. For three or more alternatives the lower bound is found for unanimous social choice functions. In the case of three alternatives the lower bound is found for surjective social choice functions. In both cases all social choice functions reaching the lower bound are characterized for more than two agents. In the case of two agents the characterized social choice functions form a subset of the set of all social choice functions reaching the minimum.",

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AB - This paper is concerned with the number of profiles at which a nondictatorial social choice function is manipulable. For three or more alternatives the lower bound is found for unanimous social choice functions. In the case of three alternatives the lower bound is found for surjective social choice functions. In both cases all social choice functions reaching the lower bound are characterized for more than two agents. In the case of two agents the characterized social choice functions form a subset of the set of all social choice functions reaching the minimum.

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Minimal Manipulable: Unanimity and Nondictatorship

Abstract

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