Minimal Manipulability: Anonymity and Unanimity

S. Maus; H.J.M. Peters; A.J.A. Storcken

doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0202-3

Minimal Manipulability: Anonymity and Unanimity

S. Maus, H.J.M. Peters^*, A.J.A. Storcken

^*Corresponding author for this work

Quantitative Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

12 Citations (Web of Science)

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function for three alternatives is manipulable. The lower bound is derived and examples of social choice functions attaining the lower bound are given. It is conjectured that these social choice functions are in fact all minimally manipulable social choice functions. Since some of these social choice functions are pareto optimal, it follows that the lower bound also holds for pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions. Some of the minimally manipulable pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions can be interpreted as status quo voting.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	247-268
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	29
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0202-3
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2007

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10.1007/s00355-006-0202-3

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