Menu mechanisms

A. Mackenzie*, Y. Zhou

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We investigate menu mechanisms: dynamic mechanisms where at each history, an agent selects from a menu of his possible assignments. We consider both ex-post implementation and full implementation for a strengthening of dominance that covers off-path histories, and provide conditions under which menu mechanisms provide these implementations of rules. Our results cover a variety of environments, including matching with contracts, labor markets, auctions, school choice, marriage, object allocation, and elections. (c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Original languageEnglish
Article number105511
Number of pages43
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume204
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sept 2022

JEL classifications

  • d47 - Market Design
  • d82 - "Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design"
  • c78 - "Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory"

Keywords

  • Menu mechanism
  • Strategy-proofness
  • Robust implementation
  • STRATEGY-PROOF ALLOCATION
  • COLLEGE ADMISSIONS
  • SCHOOL CHOICE
  • STABILITY
  • CONSTRAINTS
  • AUCTIONS
  • NASH
  • IMPLEMENTATION
  • REVELATION
  • GAMES

Cite this