Abstract
We investigate menu mechanisms: dynamic mechanisms where at each history, an agent selects from a menu of his possible assignments. We consider both ex-post implementation and full implementation for a strengthening of dominance that covers off-path histories, and provide conditions under which menu mechanisms provide these implementations of rules. Our results cover a variety of environments, including matching with contracts, labor markets, auctions, school choice, marriage, object allocation, and elections. (c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Original language | English |
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Article number | 105511 |
Number of pages | 43 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 204 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Sept 2022 |
JEL classifications
- d47 - Market Design
- d82 - "Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design"
- c78 - "Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory"
Keywords
- Menu mechanism
- Strategy-proofness
- Robust implementation
- STRATEGY-PROOF ALLOCATION
- COLLEGE ADMISSIONS
- SCHOOL CHOICE
- STABILITY
- CONSTRAINTS
- AUCTIONS
- NASH
- IMPLEMENTATION
- REVELATION
- GAMES
Prizes
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Finalist for Young Economists' Essay Awards
Mackenzie, Andy (Recipient), 2021
Prize: Prize (including medals and awards) › Academic