Abstract
We investigate menu mechanisms: dynamic mechanisms where at each history, an agent selects from a menu of his possible assignments. We consider both ex-post implementation and full implementation, for both subgame perfection and a strengthening of dominance that covers off-path histories, and provide conditions under which menu mechanisms provide these implementations of rules. In comparison to direct mechanisms, menu mechanisms offer better privacy to participants; we formalize this with a novel notion of mechanism informativeness. Our results cover a variety of environments, including elections, marriage, college admissions, auctions, labor markets, matching with contracts, and object allocation.
Original language | English |
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Publisher | SSRN |
Number of pages | 35 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2020 |
JEL classifications
- d82 - "Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design"
- d47 - Market Design
- c78 - "Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory"
Keywords
- menu mechanism
- privacy
- strategy-proofness
- robust implementation