Median Stable Matching for College Admission

B.E. Klaus; F. Klijn

doi:10.1007/s00182-006-0009-6

Median Stable Matching for College Admission

B.E. Klaus^*, F. Klijn

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-11
Number of pages	11
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	34
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0009-6
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2006

Access to Document

10.1007/s00182-006-0009-6

Cite this

@article{124e987d49aa4996aacaf0eb5ad01035,

title = "Median Stable Matching for College Admission",

abstract = "We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.",

author = "B.E. Klaus and F. Klijn",

year = "2006",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1007/s00182-006-0009-6",

language = "English",

volume = "34",

pages = "1--11",

journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",

issn = "0020-7276",

publisher = "Springer",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Median Stable Matching for College Admission

AU - Klaus, B.E.

AU - Klijn, F.

PY - 2006/1/1

Y1 - 2006/1/1

N2 - We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

AB - We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

U2 - 10.1007/s00182-006-0009-6

DO - 10.1007/s00182-006-0009-6

M3 - Article

SN - 0020-7276

VL - 34

SP - 1

EP - 11

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

ER -