Mechanisms for division problems with single-dipped preferences

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Abstract

A mechanism allocates one unit of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents reporting a number between zero and one. Nash, Pareto optimal Nash, and strong equilibria are analyzed for the case where the agents have single-dipped preferences. One of the main results is that when the mechanism is anonymous, monotonic, standard, and order preserving, then the Pareto optimal Nash and strong equilibria coincide and assign Pareto optimal allocations that are characterized by so-called maximal coalitions: members of a maximal coalition prefer an equal coalition share over obtaining zero, whereas the outside agents prefer zero over obtaining an equal share from joining the coalition.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Number of pages25
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 18 Jul 2022

Publication series

SeriesGSBE Research Memoranda
Number007
ISSN2666-8807

JEL classifications

  • c72 - Noncooperative Games
  • d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"

Keywords

  • division problems
  • single-dipped preferences
  • mechanisms
  • Nash equilibrium
  • strong equilibrium

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