@techreport{4b09b197befa4698972acad324fc22c6,
title = "Locating a public good on a sphere",
abstract = "It is shown that in a model where agents have single-peaked preferences on the sphere, every Pareto optimal social choice function that is strict or coalitional strategy-proof, is dictatorial.",
author = "S. Chatterjee and H.J.M. Peters and A.J.A. Storcken",
year = "2015",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.26481/umagsb.2015028",
language = "English",
series = "GSBE Research Memoranda",
publisher = "Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics",
number = "028",
address = "Netherlands",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics",
}