Locating a public good on a sphere

Swarnendu Chatterjee; Hans Peters; Ton Storcken

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.015

Locating a public good on a sphere

Swarnendu Chatterjee, Hans Peters^*, Ton Storcken

^*Corresponding author for this work

QE Math. Economics & Game Theory

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

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Abstract

It is shown that in a model where agents have single-peaked preferences on the sphere, every Pareto optimal social choice function that is strict or coalitional strategy-proof, is dictatorial.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	46-48
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	139
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.015
Publication status	Published - Feb 2016

Keywords

Single-peaked preferences.
Pareto optimality
Strict strategy-proofness
Coalitional strategy-proofness
STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
EXISTENCE

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10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.015Licence: Unspecified

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Cite this

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title = "Locating a public good on a sphere",

abstract = "It is shown that in a model where agents have single-peaked preferences on the sphere, every Pareto optimal social choice function that is strict or coalitional strategy-proof, is dictatorial. ",

keywords = "Single-peaked preferences., Pareto optimality, Strict strategy-proofness, Coalitional strategy-proofness, STRATEGY-PROOFNESS, EXISTENCE",

author = "Swarnendu Chatterjee and Hans Peters and Ton Storcken",

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AU - Storcken, Ton

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AB - It is shown that in a model where agents have single-peaked preferences on the sphere, every Pareto optimal social choice function that is strict or coalitional strategy-proof, is dictatorial.

KW - Single-peaked preferences.

KW - Pareto optimality

KW - Strict strategy-proofness

KW - Coalitional strategy-proofness

KW - STRATEGY-PROOFNESS

KW - EXISTENCE

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.015

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.015

M3 - Article

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VL - 139

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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