Locating a public good on a sphere

Swarnendu Chatterjee, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken

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Abstract

It is shown that in a model where agents have single-peaked preferences on the sphere, every Pareto optimal social choice function that is strict or coalitional strategy-proof, is dictatorial. 

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)46-48
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume139
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2016

Keywords

  • Single-peaked preferences.
  • Pareto optimality
  • Strict strategy-proofness
  • Coalitional strategy-proofness
  • STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
  • EXISTENCE

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