Layoffs, quits and wage negotiations

A.C. Gielen; J. van Ours

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2010.08.009

Layoffs, quits and wage negotiations

A.C. Gielen^*, J. van Ours

^*Corresponding author for this work

Macro, International & Labour Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

This paper studies the ex-ante effect of worker separations on wage negotiations using matched worker-firm data from The Netherlands. We find that wage negotiations aim to prevent separations; workers with a high propensity to quit are offered higher wages, while workers with a high layoff probability give up some of their wage.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	108-111
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	109
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.08.009
Publication status	Published - Nov 2010

Keywords

Wage negotiations
Quits
Layoffs
Matched worker-firm data

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10.1016/j.econlet.2010.08.009

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title = "Layoffs, quits and wage negotiations",

abstract = "This paper studies the ex-ante effect of worker separations on wage negotiations using matched worker-firm data from The Netherlands. We find that wage negotiations aim to prevent separations; workers with a high propensity to quit are offered higher wages, while workers with a high layoff probability give up some of their wage. ",

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author = "A.C. Gielen and {van Ours}, J.",

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AB - This paper studies the ex-ante effect of worker separations on wage negotiations using matched worker-firm data from The Netherlands. We find that wage negotiations aim to prevent separations; workers with a high propensity to quit are offered higher wages, while workers with a high layoff probability give up some of their wage.

KW - Wage negotiations

KW - Quits

KW - Layoffs

KW - Matched worker-firm data

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.08.009

M3 - Article

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VL - 109

SP - 108

EP - 111

JO - Economics Letters

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Layoffs, quits and wage negotiations

Abstract

Keywords

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