Layoffs, quits and wage negotiations

A.C. Gielen*, J. van Ours

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

3 Citations (Web of Science)


This paper studies the ex-ante effect of worker separations on wage negotiations using matched worker-firm data from The Netherlands. We find that wage negotiations aim to prevent separations; workers with a high propensity to quit are offered higher wages, while workers with a high layoff probability give up some of their wage. 

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)108-111
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2010


  • Wage negotiations
  • Quits
  • Layoffs
  • Matched worker-firm data

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