In this paper, we report on an equilibrium with market dominance that exists in a simple two-firm model that features neither entry barriers nor sophisticated punishment strategies. This equilibrium induces an intertemporal market division in which the two firms alternate as monopolists – despite the fact that the model also sustains a cournot duopoly. Even when initially both firms are active in the market, the alternating monopoly reveals itself rather quickly. Moreover, it pareto dominates the cournot equilibrium – as it is close to the cartel outcome. Several examples of what well may be such alternating monopolies are presented.
Herings, P. J. J., Peeters, R. J. A. P., & Schinkel, M. P. (2005). Intertemporal Market Division: A Case of Alternating Monopoly. European Economic Review, 49(5), 1207-1223. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2003.09.001