Insolvency judges meet strategic behaviour: A comparative empirical study

Gijs van Dijck*, Ruben Hollemans, Monika Maśnicka, Catarina Frade, Lorenzo Benedetti, Lucilla Galanti, Paula Fernando, Joanna Kruczalak-Jankowska, Niccolo Abriani, Ruben Jesus, Anna Machnikowska, Ilaria Pagni

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review


This article reports the results of a comparative empirical legal study that analyzed (1) strategic behaviour by actors in insolvencies that is salient to insolvency judges and (2) how insolvency judges respond to such behaviour. After examining four different European countries, namely Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal, the study reveals how differences regarding case allocation, judge – insolvency practitioner (IP) interaction, and remuneration and case financing can result in strategic behaviour on both the side of the judges and the IPs. From this, it follows that improving the efficiency and effectiveness is not merely a matter of implementing legislation and case law, but that it also requires a look into the dynamics between insolvency judges, IPs, and other actors in the insolvency process.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)158-177
Number of pages20
JournalMaastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law
Issue number2
Early online date30 Mar 2020
Publication statusPublished - 6 May 2020


  • insolvency
  • bankruptcy
  • empirical
  • comparative
  • judges
  • courts
  • behavior


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