Insider ownership, governance mechanisms, and corporate bond pricing around the world

Rob Bauer, Jeroen Derwall*, Nora Pankratz

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We investigate the effect of insider ownership on corporate bond yield spreads from 2003 to 2014 using a sample of 10,460 bonds issued by 1,222 non-financial firms from 44 countries. Using this sample, we find on average that greater insider ownership is associated with a higher yield spread. We consider consumption of private benefits as an economic channel through which insider ownership hurts bondholders. Using a global index of shareholder rights, we observe that the positive association between insider ownership and the spread decreases for firms with relatively stronger shareholder rights in which consumption of private benefits is less likely to occur. Furthermore, we report that in firms with more insider ownership the probability of related-party transactions is larger whereas their accounting return on assets is weaker, ceteris paribus. Taken together, the results indicate that bondholders anticipate that greater insider ownership facilitates consumption of private benefits, with implications for the valuation of corporate debt.
Original languageEnglish
Article number102423
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of International Money and Finance
Volume117
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2021

JEL classifications

  • g32 - "Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill"
  • g34 - "Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance"

Keywords

  • Corporate bonds
  • Insider ownership
  • Tunnelling
  • AGENCY COSTS
  • FIRM
  • INCENTIVES
  • VALUATION
  • RATINGS

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