Incomplete information and iterated strict dominance

Christian W. Bach; Andres Perea

doi:10.1093/oep/gpz075

Incomplete information and iterated strict dominance

Christian W. Bach^*, Andres Perea

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

The solution concept of iterated strict dominance for static games with complete information recursively deletes choices that are inferior. Here, we devise such an algorithm for the more general case of incomplete information. The ensuing solution concept of generalized iterated strict dominance is characterized in terms of common belief in rationality as well as in terms of best response sets. Besides, we provide doxastic conditions that are necessary and sufficient for modelling complete information from a one-person perspective.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	820-836
Number of pages	17
Journal	Oxford Economic Papers-New Series
Volume	73
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpz075
Publication status	Published - Apr 2021

JEL classifications

c72 - Noncooperative Games

Keywords

INTERACTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY
BELIEF
GAMES

Access to Document

10.1093/oep/gpz075

Cite this

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