Impossibilities with Kemeny updating

B. Can; A.J.A. Storcken

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.03.001

Impossibilities with Kemeny updating

B. Can^*, A.J.A. Storcken

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discussed. Here monotonicity means that if preferences update in such a way that they get closer to an outcome then at the new situation this outcome remains chosen. Strong monotonicity requires further that in those cases the outcome at the new profile is a subset of the outcome at the old profile. It is shown that only dictatorial preference correspondences are unanimous and strongly monotone.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	229-231
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	116
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.03.001
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2012

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10.1016/j.econlet.2012.03.001

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title = "Impossibilities with Kemeny updating",

abstract = "Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discussed. Here monotonicity means that if preferences update in such a way that they get closer to an outcome then at the new situation this outcome remains chosen. Strong monotonicity requires further that in those cases the outcome at the new profile is a subset of the outcome at the old profile. It is shown that only dictatorial preference correspondences are unanimous and strongly monotone.",

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AB - Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discussed. Here monotonicity means that if preferences update in such a way that they get closer to an outcome then at the new situation this outcome remains chosen. Strong monotonicity requires further that in those cases the outcome at the new profile is a subset of the outcome at the old profile. It is shown that only dictatorial preference correspondences are unanimous and strongly monotone.

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.03.001

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.03.001

M3 - Article

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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