Imperfect information and training quality

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This paper develops a theoretical model in which the level of training provided by a firm is not observed by workers. It is therefore not possible to have training wages completely contingent upon the level of training provided. Training wages will be too high. This, in turn, prevents firms from recouping the full benefits from training and leads to underinvestment. The more general the training, the more severe this underinvestment problem.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)655-671
Number of pages17
JournalLabour - Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations
Volume19
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2005

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