How to choose a fair delegation?

Burak Can*, Péter Csóka, Emre Ergin

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This paper analyzes how to choose a delegation, a committee to represent a society such as in a peace conference. We propose normative conditions and seek Pareto optimal, consistent, neutral, and non-manipulable ways to choose a delegation. We show that a class of threshold rules is characterized by these criteria. The rules do not choose a fixed number of delegates, but instead require different sizes of delegations, depending on the heterogeneity in society. Therefore the resulting delegations are very inclusive, and with t delegates the ratio of individuals whose opinions are not included is always below . For instance, a delegation of size two should have at least 75% support from the society and therefore only less than 25% of the opinion pool can be neglected.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages35
JournalEconomic Theory
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 27 Sep 2020

JEL classifications

  • c70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
  • d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"

Keywords

  • Aggregation rules
  • Committee selection
  • Conflict management
  • Kemeny distance
  • Strategy-proofness
  • PREFERENCE AGGREGATION
  • STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
  • LORENZ CURVES

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