We study the criminal networks that will emerge in the long run when criminals are neither myopic nor completely farsighted but have some limited degree of farsightedness. We adopt the horizon-K farsighted set of Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2019) to answer this question. We find that in criminal networks with n criminals, the set consisting of the complete network is a horizon-K farsighted set whenever the degree of farsightedness of the criminals is larger than or equal to (n 1). Moreover, the complete network is the unique horizon-(n 1) farsighted set. Hence, the predictions obtained in case of completely farsighted criminals still hold when criminals are much less farsighted.
|Series||GSBE Research Memoranda|
- a14 - Sociology of Economics
- c70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
- d20 - Production and Organizations: General
- Limited farsightedness
- criminal networks