Horizon-K Farsightedness in Criminal Networks

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch

Research output: Working paper / PreprintWorking paper

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Abstract

We study the criminal networks that will emerge in the long run when criminals are neither myopic nor completely farsighted but have some limited degree of farsightedness. We adopt the horizon-K farsighted set of Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2019) to answer this question. We find that in criminal networks with n criminals, the set consisting of the complete network is a horizon-K farsighted set whenever the degree of farsightedness of the criminals is larger than or equal to (n 1). Moreover, the complete network is the unique horizon-(n 1) farsighted set. Hence, the predictions obtained in case of completely farsighted criminals still hold when criminals are much less farsighted.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 4 May 2021

Publication series

SeriesGSBE Research Memoranda
Number008
ISSN2666-8807

JEL classifications

  • a14 - Sociology of Economics
  • c70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
  • d20 - Production and Organizations: General

Keywords

  • Limited farsightedness
  • stability
  • criminal networks

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