Abstract
The Dutch governments' "contourennota constitutionele toetsing" proposes lifting the ban on constitutional review and creating a constitutional court. Beyond reviewing legislation, this court might also resolve electoral disputes — a role currently filled (in final instance) by representative bodies without the possibility of appeal. In its case law, the European Court of Human Rights stresses the need for fair and objective dispute resolution. Thus, international organizations have criticized the lack of independent review in the Netherlands.
The Dutch Council of State supports introducing judicial review for election outcomes, suggesting its Administrative Jurisdiction Division as a suitable body. However, concerns remain: excessive litigation could delay election results and undermine trust in democratic processes. The government must decide if the constitutional court should handle election disputes, and clarify who can appeal, on what grounds, and at what stage. Ensuring legitimacy and public trust will be essential for any reform.
The Dutch Council of State supports introducing judicial review for election outcomes, suggesting its Administrative Jurisdiction Division as a suitable body. However, concerns remain: excessive litigation could delay election results and undermine trust in democratic processes. The government must decide if the constitutional court should handle election disputes, and clarify who can appeal, on what grounds, and at what stage. Ensuring legitimacy and public trust will be essential for any reform.
| Translated title of the contribution | The Constitutional Court as electoral arbiter? |
|---|---|
| Original language | Dutch |
| Journal | De Hofvijver |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue number | 164 |
| Publication status | Published - 28 Apr 2025 |
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