Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademic

Abstract

This chapter comments on Graham Allison’s 1971 book, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis , a classic that occupies an important place in disciplines ranging from political science and public administration to international relations and business studies. Allison offers a critical analysis of governmental decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis, one of the most challenging crises of the Cold War, through three conceptual lenses: rational actor, organizational behavior, and governmental politics. After a brief introduction on Allison and the broader context in which his work took shape, the chapter considers the continuing relevance of Essence of Decision for scholars in foreign policy and public administration. More specifically, it discusses Allison’s rational actor, organizational behavior, and governmental behavior models and how each of them identifies different explanatory factors for the decisions that were taken regarding the crisis.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Classics in Public Policy and Administration
EditorsS. Balla, M. Lodge, E. Page
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages272-286
ISBN (Print)9780199646135
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2016

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