Abstract
This article provides evidence for mixed strategy play in a natural setting, using data from penalty kicking in professional german soccer. A penalty kick is a two-person constant-sum game. We distinguish two strategies for both players, namely, choosing left or right and verify empirically that the two main requirements for the existence of a nash equilibrium in mixed strategies are met: (1) the expected payoffs are equal across strategies and (2) we cannot reject the hypothesis that players choose their actions randomly.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 371-388 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Journal of Sports Economics |
Volume | 19 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 2018 |
Keywords
- mixed strategy
- minimax
- Nash equilibrium
- MIXED-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA
- PENALTY KICKS
- LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS
- SOCCER GOALKEEPERS
- RANDOM SEQUENCES
- VISUAL-SEARCH
- HOT HAND
- PROFESSIONALS
- ANTICIPATION
- GENERATION