Further Field Evidence for Minimax Play

Thomas Dohmen*, Hendrik Sonnabend

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

6 Citations (Web of Science)

Abstract

This article provides evidence for mixed strategy play in a natural setting, using data from penalty kicking in professional german soccer. A penalty kick is a two-person constant-sum game. We distinguish two strategies for both players, namely, choosing left or right and verify empirically that the two main requirements for the existence of a nash equilibrium in mixed strategies are met: (1) the expected payoffs are equal across strategies and (2) we cannot reject the hypothesis that players choose their actions randomly.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)371-388
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Sports Economics
Volume19
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2018

Keywords

  • mixed strategy
  • minimax
  • Nash equilibrium
  • MIXED-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA
  • PENALTY KICKS
  • LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS
  • SOCCER GOALKEEPERS
  • RANDOM SEQUENCES
  • VISUAL-SEARCH
  • HOT HAND
  • PROFESSIONALS
  • ANTICIPATION
  • GENERATION

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