@article{bebb5300ef144d46be6047fa6fa22f41,
title = "From Angels to Humans: Law, Coercion, and The Society of Angels Thought Experiment",
abstract = "Whether legal systems are necessarily coercive raises normative concerns. Coercion carries a presumption of illegitimacy and a special justificatory burden. If legal systems are necessarily coercive, coerciveness necessarily taints our legal institutions. Traditionally, legal systems have been regarded as contingently coercive. This view is mainly supported by the society of angels thought experiment. For the past few years, however, this traditional view has been under attack. Critics have challenged the reliability of the thought experiment and have urged us to centre the discussion on typical legal systems: legal systems made by humans to address human needs. Once we do so – they claim – we would inevitably reject the traditional view. This paper argues that the critics are wrong. After discussing key features of the society of angels thought experiment and responding to objections, it is argued that even typical legal systems are contingently coercive. Coerciveness is a feature that our legal systems can and should strive to get rid of.",
keywords = "ALTRUISM",
author = "\{Miotto Lopes\}, Lucas",
note = "Funding Information: I have greatly benefitted from exchanges with several colleagues and friends at different stages of the development of this paper. Thanks to Antony Duff, Claudio Michelon, Dan Priel, Elinor Mason, Euan MacDonald, Himani Bhakuni, James Edwards, James Manwaring, Ken Himma, Leah Trueblood, Lu{\'i}s Duarte d{\textquoteright}Almeida, Martin Kelly, Matheus Silva, Neil Walker, Nicos Stavropoulos, Noel Struchiner, Pedro M{\'u}rias, Silvan Wittwer, and Timothy Endicott. Some of the ideas that found their way into this paper have been presented at the Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group and at the Edinburgh Ethics Fest. I thank everyone who participated in those events. I am also grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their thorough engagement with this paper and to the editors of Law and Philosophy. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020, The Author(s).",
year = "2021",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1007/s10982-020-09396-1",
language = "English",
volume = "40",
pages = "277--303",
journal = "Law and Philosophy",
issn = "0167-5249",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "3",
}