@article{3090a48168c0478c8bfc7529e67c2562,
title = "Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs",
abstract = "We study how switching costs affect the subgame perfect equilibria in repeated games. We show that (i) the Folk Theorem holds whenever the players are patient enough; (ii) the set of equilibrium payoffs is obtained by considering the payoffs of a simple one-shot auxiliary game; and (iii) the switching costs have a negative impact on a player in the infinitely undiscounted repeated game but can be beneficial for him in a finitely repeated game or in a discounted game.",
keywords = "Folk theorem, Non-zero-sum games, Repeated games, Stochastic games, Switching costs",
author = "Yevgeny Tsodikovich and Xavier Venel and Anna Zseleva",
note = "Funding Information: We thank Stephane Gaubert, Chantal Marlats, and Guillaume Vigeral for their highly valuable comments. YT acknowledges the support of The Israel Science Foundation grants \#2566/20, \#1626/18 \& \#448/22. XV is a member of the Gruppo Nazionale per l'Analisi Matematica, la Probabilit\textbackslash{}u00E0 e le loro Applicazioni. XV is part of the Italian MIUR PRIN PNRR project \textbackslash{}u201CSupply chain disruptions, Financial losses and their preventions\textbackslash{}u201D (project P2022XT8C8) and the MIUR PRIN 2022 project \textbackslash{}u201CLearning in Markets and Society\textbackslash{}u201D (project 2022EKNE5K). data source: no data used",
year = "2024",
month = jul,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.006",
language = "English",
volume = "146",
pages = "137--159",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
}