After the eurozone crisis, european union (eu) member states have the obligation to establish independent fiscal institutions (ifis)—also known as fiscal councils—composed of recognised experts responsible for the monitoring of the compliance with fiscal rules in accordance with european norms. Eurozone countries are the first addressees of this obligation and are bound by stricter legal constraints than states outside the euro area. The form these ifis take varies from one member state to the other and so do their powers. In any event, in requiring their creation, the european norms have potentially led to a reorganisation and a change in the institutional balance at national level. At the same time, they may have participated to the improvement of democracy in ensuring more independent expertise, transparent and public information, and knowledge that parliaments can use to control and scrutinise their government’s actions, although the fiscal councils themselves remain weak. In this context, this contribution aims to answer the following research question: do ifis, according to the new european and national rules of implementation, constitute a threat to democracy or, rather could they, in fact, enhance democracy?.
|Title of host publication||Democracy in the EMU in the Aftermath of the Crisis|
|Editors||Luigi Daniele, Pierluigi Simone, Roberto Cisotta|
|Place of Publication||Heidelberg|
|Number of pages||18|
|Publication status||Published - 2017|