Finitely additive behavioral strategies: when do they induce an unambiguous expected payoff?

Janos Flesch, Dries Vermeulen*, Anna Zseleva

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We examine infinite horizon decision problems with arbitrary bounded payoff functions in which the decision maker uses finitely additive behavioral strategies. Since we only assume that the payoff function is bounded, it is well-known that these behavioral strategies generally do not induce unambiguously defined expected payoffs. Consequently, it is not clear how to compare behavioral strategies and define optimality. We address this problem by finding conditions on the payoff function that guarantee an unambiguous expected payoff regardless of which behavioral strategy the decision maker uses. To this end, we systematically consider various alternatives proposed in the literature on how to define the finitely additive probability measure on the set of infinite plays induced by a behavioral strategy.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)695-723
Number of pages29
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume53
Issue number2
Early online date1 May 2024
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2024

JEL classifications

  • c72 - Noncooperative Games

Keywords

  • Infinite duration decision problem
  • Behavioral strategy
  • Expected payoff
  • Finitely additive probability measure
  • C72
  • GAMES

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