Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining

Bram Driesen; Michele Lombardi; Hans Peters

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.06.003

Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining

Bram Driesen
, Michele Lombardi
, Hans Peters^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

QE Math. Economics & Game Theory

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

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Abstract

We study feasible sets of the bargaining problem under two different assumptions: the players are subjective expected utility maximizers or the players are Choquet expected utility maximizers. For the latter case, we consider the effects on bargaining solutions when players become more risk averse and when they become more uncertainty averse

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	162-170
Number of pages	9
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	67
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.06.003
Publication status	Published - Dec 2016

Keywords

Subjective expected utility
Choquet expected utility
Comparative risk aversion
Comparative uncertainty aversion
Bargaining
AMBIGUITY
OUTCOMES
ADDITIVITY
UTILITY

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10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.06.003

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abstract = "We study feasible sets of the bargaining problem under two different assumptions: the players are subjective expected utility maximizers or the players are Choquet expected utility maximizers. For the latter case, we consider the effects on bargaining solutions when players become more risk averse and when they become more uncertainty averse",

keywords = "Subjective expected utility, Choquet expected utility, Comparative risk aversion, Comparative uncertainty aversion, Bargaining, AMBIGUITY, OUTCOMES, ADDITIVITY, UTILITY",

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AB - We study feasible sets of the bargaining problem under two different assumptions: the players are subjective expected utility maximizers or the players are Choquet expected utility maximizers. For the latter case, we consider the effects on bargaining solutions when players become more risk averse and when they become more uncertainty averse

KW - Subjective expected utility

KW - Choquet expected utility

KW - Comparative risk aversion

KW - Comparative uncertainty aversion

KW - Bargaining

KW - AMBIGUITY

KW - OUTCOMES

KW - ADDITIVITY

KW - UTILITY

U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.06.003

DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.06.003

M3 - Article

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VL - 67

SP - 162

EP - 170

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

ER -

Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining

Abstract

Keywords

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