Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining

Bram Driesen, Michele Lombardi, Hans Peters

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Abstract

We study feasible sets of the bargaining problem under two different assumptions: the players are subjective expected utility maximizers or the players are Choquet expected utility maximizers. For the latter case, we consider the effects on bargaining solutions when players become more risk averse and when they become more uncertainty averse

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)162-170
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume67
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2016

Keywords

  • Subjective expected utility
  • Choquet expected utility
  • Comparative risk aversion
  • Comparative uncertainty aversion
  • Bargaining
  • AMBIGUITY
  • OUTCOMES
  • ADDITIVITY
  • UTILITY

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