Feasible elimination procedures in social choice : an axiomatic characterization

B. Peleg, H.J.M. Peters

Research output: Working paper / PreprintWorking paper

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Abstract

Feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) play a central role in constructing social choice functions which have the following property: in the associated game form, for any preference profile there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. In this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of the social choice correspondence resulting from applying feasible elimination procedures. The axioms are anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationMaastricht
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2016

Publication series

SeriesGSBE Research Memoranda
Number001

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