Farsighted stability for roommate markets

B.E. Klaus, F. Klijn, M. Walzl

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5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study farsighted stability for roommate markets. We show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets. We show that a singleton is von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present a roommate market without a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Example 1) and a roommate market with a nonsingleton von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Example 2).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)921-933
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Volume13
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2011

Keywords

  • STABLE SETS
  • COALITIONAL STABILITY
  • RANDOM-PATHS
  • NETWORKS
  • GAMES

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