Farsighted house allocation

B.E. Klaus, F. Klijn, M. Walzl

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

In this note we study von neumann–morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for shapley and scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2010) shows that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von neumann–morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of antisymmetric weak dominance (cf., wako, 1999). We demonstrate that the set of competitive allocations also coincides with the unique von neumann–morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of strong dominance (cf., roth and postlewaite, 1977) if no individual is indifferent between his endowment and the endowment of someone else.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)817-824
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume46
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2010

Cite this