Fairly taking turns

Andrew Mackenzie; Vilmos Komornik

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.005

Fairly taking turns

Andrew Mackenzie^*
, Vilmos Komornik

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We investigate the fair division of a sequence of time slots when each agent is sufficiently patient. If agents have identical preferences, then we construct perfectly equitable and efficient allocations. Otherwise, (i) if there are two agents, then we construct envy-free allocations, (ii) if there are three agents, then we construct proportional allocations, and (iii) in general, we construct approximately fair allocations. Finally, we investigate achieving approximate fairness at each time period, strategy-proofness, and a notion of computational simplicity.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	743-764
Number of pages	22
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	142
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.005
Publication status	Published - 1 Nov 2023

JEL classifications

d63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"

Keywords

Fair division
Intertemporal choice

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10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.005Licence: CC BY

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title = "Fairly taking turns",

abstract = "We investigate the fair division of a sequence of time slots when each agent is sufficiently patient. If agents have identical preferences, then we construct perfectly equitable and efficient allocations. Otherwise, (i) if there are two agents, then we construct envy-free allocations, (ii) if there are three agents, then we construct proportional allocations, and (iii) in general, we construct approximately fair allocations. Finally, we investigate achieving approximate fairness at each time period, strategy-proofness, and a notion of computational simplicity.",

keywords = "Fair division, Intertemporal choice",

author = "Andrew Mackenzie and Vilmos Komornik",

note = "Funding Information: The work of V.K. was partially supported by the grant No. 11871348 of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC). We thank two anonymous referees, Steven Brams, Jens Gudmundsson, Ehud Lehrer, Mihai Manea, William Thomson, Christian Trudeau, Yu Zhou, Bill Zwicker, and participants at the 2023 Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Conference. No data was used for the research described in the article.",

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doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.005",

language = "English",

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T1 - Fairly taking turns

AU - Mackenzie, Andrew

AU - Komornik, Vilmos

N1 - Funding Information: The work of V.K. was partially supported by the grant No. 11871348 of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC). We thank two anonymous referees, Steven Brams, Jens Gudmundsson, Ehud Lehrer, Mihai Manea, William Thomson, Christian Trudeau, Yu Zhou, Bill Zwicker, and participants at the 2023 Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Conference. No data was used for the research described in the article.

PY - 2023/11/1

Y1 - 2023/11/1

N2 - We investigate the fair division of a sequence of time slots when each agent is sufficiently patient. If agents have identical preferences, then we construct perfectly equitable and efficient allocations. Otherwise, (i) if there are two agents, then we construct envy-free allocations, (ii) if there are three agents, then we construct proportional allocations, and (iii) in general, we construct approximately fair allocations. Finally, we investigate achieving approximate fairness at each time period, strategy-proofness, and a notion of computational simplicity.

AB - We investigate the fair division of a sequence of time slots when each agent is sufficiently patient. If agents have identical preferences, then we construct perfectly equitable and efficient allocations. Otherwise, (i) if there are two agents, then we construct envy-free allocations, (ii) if there are three agents, then we construct proportional allocations, and (iii) in general, we construct approximately fair allocations. Finally, we investigate achieving approximate fairness at each time period, strategy-proofness, and a notion of computational simplicity.

KW - Fair division

KW - Intertemporal choice

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.005

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.005

M3 - Article

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 142

SP - 743

EP - 764

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

Fairly taking turns

Abstract

JEL classifications

Keywords

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