"Fair marriages": An impossibility

B.E. Klaus

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2009.06.006

"Fair marriages": An impossibility

B.E. Klaus^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

For marriage markets [Gale, D. and Shapley, L.S., 1962, College admissions and the stability of marriage, American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9–15.] so-called fair matchings do not always exist. We show that restoring fairness by using monetary transfers is not always possible: there are marriage markets where no amount of money can guarantee the existence of a fair allocation.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	74-75
Number of pages	2
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	105
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.06.006
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2009

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10.1016/j.econlet.2009.06.006

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abstract = "For marriage markets [Gale, D. and Shapley, L.S., 1962, College admissions and the stability of marriage, American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9–15.] so-called fair matchings do not always exist. We show that restoring fairness by using monetary transfers is not always possible: there are marriage markets where no amount of money can guarantee the existence of a fair allocation.",

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AB - For marriage markets [Gale, D. and Shapley, L.S., 1962, College admissions and the stability of marriage, American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9–15.] so-called fair matchings do not always exist. We show that restoring fairness by using monetary transfers is not always possible: there are marriage markets where no amount of money can guarantee the existence of a fair allocation.

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JO - Economics Letters

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"Fair marriages": An impossibility

Abstract

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