"Fair marriages": An impossibility

B.E. Klaus

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

For marriage markets [Gale, D. and Shapley, L.S., 1962, College admissions and the stability of marriage, American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9–15.] so-called fair matchings do not always exist. We show that restoring fairness by using monetary transfers is not always possible: there are marriage markets where no amount of money can guarantee the existence of a fair allocation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)74-75
Number of pages2
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume105
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2009

Cite this

Klaus, B.E. / "Fair marriages": An impossibility. In: Economics Letters. 2009 ; Vol. 105, No. 1. pp. 74-75.
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"Fair marriages": An impossibility. / Klaus, B.E.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 105, No. 1, 01.01.2009, p. 74-75.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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