Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped

Bas Dietzenbacher; Yuki Tamura

doi:10.26481/umagsb.2023009

Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped

Bas Dietzenbacher
, Yuki Tamura

Research output: Working paper / Preprint › Working paper

320 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We combine Pareto optimality with equal treatment of equals, the equal division lower bound, the equal division core, envy-freeness, and group envy-freeness. For each of these fairness requirements, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility with Pareto optimality and we characterize all corresponding allocations for each preference profile.

Original language	English
Place of Publication	Maastricht
Publisher	Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Number of pages	16
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2023009
Publication status	Published - 19 Jun 2023

Publication series

Series	GSBE Research Memoranda
Number	009
ISSN	2666-8807

JEL classifications

d63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"

Keywords

resource allocation
single-dipped preferences
Pareto optimality
fairness

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10.26481/umagsb.2023009

RM23009Final published version, 584 KB

1 Article

Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped
Dietzenbacher, B. & Tamura, Y., Dec 2024, In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. 115, 7 p., 103048.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Open Access

Cite this

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Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped

Abstract

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JEL classifications

Keywords

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Research output

Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped

Cite this