Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped

Bas Dietzenbacher; Yuki Tamura

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103048

Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped

Bas Dietzenbacher^*, Yuki Tamura

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We combine Pareto optimality with equal treatment of equals, the equal division lower bound, the equal division core, envy-freeness, and group envy-freeness. For each of these fairness requirements, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility with Pareto optimality and we characterize all corresponding allocations for each preference profile.

Original language	English
Article number	103048
Number of pages	7
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	115
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103048
Publication status	Published - Dec 2024

Keywords

resource allocation
single-dipped preferences
Pareto optimality
fairness

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10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103048Licence: CC BY

1 Working paper

Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped
Dietzenbacher, B. & Tamura, Y., 19 Jun 2023, Maastricht: Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics, 16 p. (GSBE Research Memoranda; No. 009).
Research output: Working paper / Preprint › Working paper

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title = "Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped",

abstract = "One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We combine Pareto optimality with equal treatment of equals, the equal division lower bound, the equal division core, envy-freeness, and group envy-freeness. For each of these fairness requirements, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility with Pareto optimality and we characterize all corresponding allocations for each preference profile.",

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author = "Bas Dietzenbacher and Yuki Tamura",

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AU - Dietzenbacher, Bas

AU - Tamura, Yuki

N1 - No data was used for the research described in the article.

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Y1 - 2024/12

N2 - One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We combine Pareto optimality with equal treatment of equals, the equal division lower bound, the equal division core, envy-freeness, and group envy-freeness. For each of these fairness requirements, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility with Pareto optimality and we characterize all corresponding allocations for each preference profile.

AB - One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We combine Pareto optimality with equal treatment of equals, the equal division lower bound, the equal division core, envy-freeness, and group envy-freeness. For each of these fairness requirements, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility with Pareto optimality and we characterize all corresponding allocations for each preference profile.

KW - resource allocation

KW - single-dipped preferences

KW - Pareto optimality

KW - fairness

U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103048

DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103048

M3 - Article

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VL - 115

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

M1 - 103048

ER -

Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped

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Keywords

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Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped

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