Extrapolation and structural similarity in games

F. Mengel; E. Sciubba

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.015

Extrapolation and structural similarity in games

F. Mengel^*, E. Sciubba

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We conduct a laboratory experiment and provide evidence of learning spillovers within and across equivalence classes of "structurally similar" games. These spillovers are inconsistent with existing theories of learning in games.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	381-385
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	125
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.015
Publication status	Published - Dec 2014

Keywords

Game theory
Learning
Extrapolation
Similarity
Experiments

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10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.015

Cite this

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title = "Extrapolation and structural similarity in games",

abstract = "We conduct a laboratory experiment and provide evidence of learning spillovers within and across equivalence classes of {"}structurally similar{"} games. These spillovers are inconsistent with existing theories of learning in games.",

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author = "F. Mengel and E. Sciubba",

year = "2014",

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AB - We conduct a laboratory experiment and provide evidence of learning spillovers within and across equivalence classes of "structurally similar" games. These spillovers are inconsistent with existing theories of learning in games.

KW - Game theory

KW - Learning

KW - Extrapolation

KW - Similarity

KW - Experiments

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.015

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.015

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 125

SP - 381

EP - 385

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 3

ER -

Extrapolation and structural similarity in games

Abstract

Keywords

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